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WASHINGTON'S WAR WITH NICARAGUA
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Ambassador Antonio Jarquin
NICARA GUA IS PREPAR ED
TO ESTABLISH NORMAL . ..
RELAT IONS WITH THE
U.S. WE DEMAN D ONLY
THAT OUR COUNT RY . . .
BE RESPECTED. WE HAVE
A RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINAT ION. WE HAVE A
RIGHT TO A LIFE OF
DIGNITY, AND WE WILL DEFEND THAT RIGHT.
How would you describe current relations between the
United States and Nicaragua?
Jarquin: The relations between the two countries are tense
because of the hostile attitude of the Reagan administration
towards the people and government of Nicaragua. Even before taking office, the Reagan administration announced
that they would do everything possible to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. And just a few months after President Reagan was inaugurated, we began to hear reports
about millions of dollars being allocated to finance CIA
covert operations against the Nicaraguan government. The
Reagan administration has promoted the regrouping of the
defeated former Somoza National Guard; allowed them to
train openly in Florida, Texas, and California (in clear violation of the United States Neutrality Act); and later transferred them to Honduras. From bases in Hondura s, these
former guards are now attacking and killing Nicaraguan
citizens along the border areas-w ith weapons and direction
provided by the CIA.

Our government as well as those of several Western European and Latin American countries have tried, to no avail,
to persuade the Reagan administration to set aside its militaristic approach to the problems of Central America.
What role is Nicaragua playing in the current situation in
El Salvador and Central America?
Jarquin: The government of Nicaragua morally supports the
struggle of the people of El Salvador. We cannot do otherwise because we are a people that have suffered oppression
and injustice and we are a people who since July 19, 1979
began to enjoy freedom for the first time in our history. We
believe that it is the moral obligation of those who enjoy
freedom to support the struggle of people elsewhere who
are fighting to be free.
Our support, however, does not include material aid . It
is interesting to note that the Reagan administration has not
presented any evidence to support its allegation that there
is a flow of arms from Nicaragua to the revolutionary forces
in El Salvador. I submit that no such evidence is forthcoming
because such flows of arms do not exist. It is not the policy
of the government of Nicaragua to give material aid to the
guerrillas in El Salvador because we know that this is precisely the pretext that the Reagan administration would like to
have as a justification to intervene in El Salvador.
What are the problems that Nicaragua sees as impediments
to the normalization of relations between your country and
the United States?
Jarquin: The fundamental impediment is the attitude of the
Reagan administration as reflected in its policy towards
Nicaragua. Nicaragua is prepared to establish normal and

friendly relations with the United States. We demand only
that our country, though small in territorial extension, be
respected. We have a right to self-determination. We have
a right to a life of dignity, and we will defend that right.
We cannot accept the proposition that a life of dignity for
the Nicaraguan people precludes the possibility of normal,
respectful, and peaceful relations between our country and
the government of the United States of America.
What steps is your government prepared to take to bring
about regional peace and to improve relations with the
United States?
Jarquin: On the 19th of July of this year, the government
of Nicaragua presented a six-point peace proposal. At that
time, my government stated its willingness to address the
concerns that the government of the United States claims
to have with respect to Nicaragua. We also stated that the
co,ncerns of Nicaragua with respect to the United States
should be addressed as well. The Reagan administration's
response was the deployment of three major naval task
forces and the announced stationing of U.S. troops in Honduras, precisely in the region of that country which is used
by the former Somoza national guards as sanctuaries and
staging areas for attacks against Nicaragua.
Nevertheless, we will continue to pursue a peaceful solution to the conflict and be supportive of the initiatives of
the CONTADORA group because the alternative that is being pursued by the Reagan administration will inevitably lead
to a Vietnam-like situation in the heart of this continent.
We are convinced that the people of the United States do
not wish to see a repetition of the nightmare of Vietnaman experience we in Central American most definitely would
like to avoid.
The Reagan administration describes the counterrevolutionary forces as "freedom fighters" and denies that it is
aiding in an attempt to overthrow your government. Jlow
would you describe these forces?
Jarquin: The Reagan administration's "freedom fighters"
are, in fact,' remnants of the former Somoza National
Guard-organized, trained, armed, and directed by the U.S.
government through the CIA. These "freedom fighters" are
the same people that murdered more than fifty thousand
Nicaraguans during the last two years of the Somoza family
dictatorship. The Reagan administration's "freedom
fighters" are· former members of what was, in effect,
Somoza's private army-an army which kept Somoza in
power for more than forty-five years through torture, repression, and murder of more than three hundred thousand
citizens of Nicaragua.

October 1983

Vol. 2, No. 9

TransAfrica Forum Issue Brief©
545 Eighth Street S.E., Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20003

Cherri D. Waters ................ Research Fellow
Menda Ahart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Administrator
Randall Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Executive Director
ISSN 0730-88X

With respect to U.S. aid to these former Somoza National
Guards, there is no question whatsoever. The U.S . House
of Representatives voted this past summer to cut off funds
going to Somoza guards-via the CIA-precisely because
the majority of the members of that body have become convinced that these funds are being used, in violation of the
laws of the United States, to sponsor the overthrow of a
government that has diplomatic relations with the United
States. Also there are statements by the leaders of these
counterrevolutionary forces affirming that they are receiving aid from the U.S. government.
Recently, three former pilots of Somoza's Air Force were
shot down in a DC-3C while flying a supply mission over
Nicaraguan territory. These former Somoza guards, one of
them an ex-major, stated categorically that the CIA gave
the airplane to the counterrevolutionary forces . They added
that the CIA plans to ship more planes and to retrain more
pilots before November, when a major offensive against
Nicaraguan population centers is scheduled to begin.
How would you assess the recent U.S. invasion of Grenada?
What are the implications for U.S.-Nicaraguan relations?
Jarquin: The U.S. invasion of Grenada is in fact the
culmination of a plan set in motion by the Reagan administration upon assuming office, and it consists fundamentally of doing everything possible, including the use of military
force, to impose the will of the U.S. government on countries like Grenada and Nicaragua.
Why has the U.S. government unleashed an international
campaign of slogans, lies, half truths, and distortions against
Nicaragua? I submit that this is all part of a plan that seeks
to create a climate that the Reagan administration would
then use to provoke actions in Central America which would
subsequently and irrevocably lead to direct U.S. military intervention, an eventuality bound to spark a regional war in
Central America.
The tragedy in Grenada should give us pause. We should
ask ourselves whether in the fourth quarter of the twentieth
century we are going to allow the discredited and failed
policy of the past hundred and more years of successive U.S.
governments towards Latin America and the Caribbean to
continue and hence, foster the seeds of resentment and conflicts, or if we are to fashion a new relationship based on
respect and the recognition that peace is guaranteed only
when justice and freedom prevails for all.
Today the people of Nicaragua are enraged because of
the crimes against us committed by the U.S. government.
The fury of the people when just is also sacred and more
powerful than naval fleets, tanks, or war planes. We are not
a military power but we feel ourselves to be a moral power.
That is why the war against Nicaragua would not be conventional. If attacked, we will defend ourselves. We are sure
that we will be supporte,d by other people of this continent,
including important sectors of the U.S.
The people of Nicaragua, even as·' we prepare ourselves
to repel any outside aggression, cqntinue to be optimistic
that reason will triumph and that the forces of war presently unleashed will be reined in, never again to be set free.
It is still not too late. D

THE KISSINGER COMMISSION

World attention was at least temporarily diverted from
U.S. militarization of Central America by President Reagan's appointment of Henry Kissinger as chairman of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The
Commission seems to be an essential element of administration efforts to dispel the growing opposition of U.S . policy
in Central America. Reagan administration officials repeatedly have told reporters that criticism of U.S. policy should
be withheld until the Commission report is submitted on
January 10, 1984.
The names of appointees to the Commission were announced with great fanfare, but of the twelve named
(Nicholas Brady, Henry Cisneros, William Clements, Carlos
Diaz-Alejandro, Wilson Johnson, Lane Kirkland, Richard
Scammon, John Silber, Potter Stewart, Robert Strauss, and
William Walsh) none has generated the controversy which
accompanied the announcement of its chairman. Even Kissinger supporters admitted that the former Secretary of State
had neither exhibited an interest or demonstrated expertise
in Central American affairs. Many others noted his tendency
to view every conflict as a product of Soviet influence. Kissinger's role in the CIA orchestrated overthrow of Chile's
Salvador Allende and in U.S.-South African attempts to unseat the Angolan government exacerbated concerns about
his leadership of the Commission.
The Commission's investigative process has been as conttoversial as its membership. The Commission sent questionnaires to more than 200 people selected by its staff and
approved by the 12 Commissioners. Some recipients commented publicly that the questions were too broad, sought
basic information, and were suggestive of particular
answers. Others noted that educational groups and area
specialists with progressive postures were not even asked to
share their views.
The travel itinerary for the Commission's fact finding mission also suggested that only information favorable to the
administration was being sought. Only nine hours were
scheduled for a visit to Nicaragua. Instead, at least three
members of the Commission, including Kissinger himself,
took time while in Costa Rica to meet with U.S.-sponsored
forces fighting the Nicaraguan government. This meeting
not only contradicted the publicly-stated Commission policy
of traveling together, but caused dissension among Commission members who felt that it was an inappropriate
breach of protocol to meet with anti-government forces
before meeting with the Nicaraguan government itself. San
Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros spoke to reporters about
the apparent double-standard: the Commission refused to
meet with the liberation movement fighting against the
Salvadoran junta but willingly met with anti-Nicaraguan
forces. Perhaps because of the attention given his statements, the Commission later amended its plans to include
a meeting with Salvadoran representatives in Washington
DC. Unless rather dramatic changes are made, the Kissinger
Commission promises to serve only as another tool of U.S.
policy. As Mayor Cisneros stated, "The U.S. generally is
in a poor position to be either the solution to the problem
alone, or even to aspire to lead negotiations because of our
history in the region." D

THE CONTADORA GROUP

Working together since their January 1983 meeting on
Contadora Island (off the coast of Panama), the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela have
attempted to make progress in their effort to reduce tensions in Central America. While their peace initiatives have
been welcomed by the Central American countries and supported by many other nations throughout the world, the
Reagan administration has greeted each success of the CONT ADORA Group with skepticism and continued to seek its
own military solution to the region's problems.
CONTADORA Group members have warned of the
danger of viewing Central American conflicts within the context of the East-West confrontation. Their own histories
have helped them to understand that neither the systemic
problems of developing countries nor the tensions among
Latin American countries and the U.S. began with the 1917
Soviet Revolution or the development of a "Communist
Bloc." Each of the CONT ADORA nations has had its own
experience with U.S. intervention. Therefore, the group continues to stress the importance of non-intervention and selfdetermination in its proposals for peace.
The approach taken by the CONT ADORA Group in its
search for peace is markedly different from that of U.S.sponsored initiatives . The CONTADORA Group has arranged rounds of discussions between representatives of all
Central American nations and has incorporated suggestions
received from each. In response to a Costa Rican government request, an Observer Commission consisting of two
representatives from each country was formed under CONT ADORA auspices in May and now continues to serve as
an advisory group in all matters pertaining to the solution
of border problems. By September the foreign ministers of
the CONTADORA Group and those of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua had reached
agreement on a document of common objectives that constituted a basis of understanding for future negotiations over
the mechanisms needed to formalize commitments and ensure systems of verification and control. On October 5, 1983
President Betancur of Colombia was able to announce that
the five Central American nations had agreed to a declaration on future issues to negotiate, the freeze on arms importation and army size, the reduction of the number of
military advisors, and the use of one nation's territory for
the destabilization of another. The declaration, which
Nicaragua was the first to sign, constitutes a statement of
intention to begin substantive negotiations on issues outlined
in the twenty-one point proposal formulated in September
by the Central American foreign ministers. However, even
as the declaration was being sent to the U.N. Secretary
General in accordance with Security Council resolutions on
the issue, the U.S. was denigrating the value of such
diplomatic breakthroughs and reiterating its support for
anti-government forces attacking Nicaragua. The CONT ADORA Group has argued that the primary responsibility for achieving an agreement that will guarantee lasting
peace and stability falls primarily on the Central American
nations themselves. Unless the U.S. curtails its military and
political involvement in the region, however, the efforts of
the CONTADORA Group will prove futile. D
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THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA: "AFTER 126 YEARS THE ENEMY IS THE SAME"

An American visitor to Nicaragua recently saw a banner
which read, "A 126 anos el enemigo es el mismo" (After
126 years the enemy is the same). Nicaraguans recall that
since the 19th century, the U.S. has intervened-both directly and indirectly-in their internal affairs with great
regularity. Citing the Monroe Doctrine as the basis for its
claim, by the mid-1800s, the U.S. sought to expel the British
from Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast so that it could control the
area's resources. Pressure from wealthy slaveowners-who
sought to add Nicaragua as a slave territory-and from
industrialists-who competed to build railroad and canal
routes- made the issue of U.S. or British control a central
theme of Nicaraguan politics until 1894 when the British effectively transferred control of the region to the U.S.
Major armed U.S. intervention in Nicaragua began in
1854 when the Navy destroyed the Nicaraguan town of San
Juan de! Sur. In 1855 the Tennessee filibuster William
Walker, accompanied by his 58-man "American Phalanx
of Immortals," occupied Nicaragua, unilaterally installed
himself as president, contracted foreign loans which used
Nicaraguan territory as collateral, reinstituted slavery, confiscated Nicaraguan landholdings for redistribution to U.S.
citizens, and declared English the official language.
Although Walker acted as an individual, he was backed by
the Southern slave states; and he received immediate
diplomatic recognition from the U.S. government. In 1857
Walker was defeated by the combined armies of several Central American countries and was forced to return to the U.S.
The administration of President William Howard Taft
helped to sponsor a revolt and supported the establishment
of a more pro-American government in 1909 because it
argued that Nicaragua's president was contributing to internal turmoil in neighboring states. Three year's later, Taft
sent more than 12,000 American fighting men to restore
"stability" to Nicaragua. U.S. financial interests operated
ti;le railway and the Central Bank, and the U.S. government
· supervised the collection of custom duties. A small marine
force remained in the country until 1925.
In 1927 President Coolidge ordered a second protracted
military occupation of Nicaragua. The foreign menace to
be fought was Mexico, which the U.S. described as being
under "Moscow's influence," charged with promoting
"bolshevism," and accused of supplying arms to Nicaraguan
rebels led by General Augusto Cesar Sandino. In 1928 the
Marines supervised elections at the same time that they
fought Sandino's forces. On December 31, 1930 eight
Marines on patrol in the hills were killed by Sandino's guerrillas. The resulting uproar from the U.S. led to the
withdrawal of the Marines from a direct combat role; and
in two years, the Senate adopted an amendment to the appropriations bill prohibiting the use of funds to transport
Marines to Nicaragua.
The solution to its continuing problems in Nicaragua, so
the U.S. thought, wasrthe creation of a Nicaraguan substitute for the Marines: the National Guard, a military and
police force. When the Marines were finally sent home in
January 1933 unable to win a military victory, they left in
their stead the National Guard with Anastasio Somoza Garcia as its commander. Sandino, who accepted a ceasefire
and disarmament agreement in February 1933, was killed
by the Guard one year later. Somoza consolidated the harshly repressive rule of the Guard which was continued by his
son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The U.S. plan seemed to
work for more than four decades-that is, until Somoza
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Debayle was overthrown by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1979.
In the 1920s Will Rogers is quoted as having asked, "Why
are we in Nicaragua and what the hell are we doing there?"
The same questions may be as easily asked today, and the
answers would be quite simple. The Reagan administration
is attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government. Currently, U.S. forces may not be directly "in Nicaragua," but
the Reagan administration has chosen an exile army, composed of former members of the Guard, who are backed
by American military power, to serve as its proxy in the war
with Nicaragua. For more than two years, the CIA has paid,
supplied, and trained 10,000 counterrevolutionaries, known
as "contras," who are based in Honduras just across the
border from Nicaragua. The administration has assured the
Congress that these "freedom fighters" strike only at
military targets. The truth is that, since March 1982, the contras have killed more than 700 persons who were mostly
unarmed civilians. Farm buildings have been destroyed by
mortar fire; peasants have been kidnapped across the border;
teachers, health care workers, and agricultural technicians
have been innocent victims of assassination.
In early August U.S. army, marine, and air forces units
began preparing for an unprecedentedly long six months of
training maneuvers with Honduran forces, including nearly 6,000 U.S. combat troops ashore and two carrier task
groups patrolling positions off Nicaragua's Atlantic and
Pacific coasts. The administration's assertion that these
maneuvers are "routine" is completely unfounded. The
largest previous land exercise in Honduras involved 900 U.S.
troops and lasted only 6 days. No precedent exists for the
scale, proximity, or intent of the naval deployments.
But the U.S .-sponsored wars on Nicaragua's borders cannot topple the Sandinista government without more direct
U.S. intervention. The contras may be well-trained and wellarmed, but they are far outnumbered by the Sandinistas.
More importantly, Nicaraguans-unlike their fellow Central Americans-are no longer a people terrorized by their
own armed forces and will fight to protect hard-won gains
made since 1979.
What the Reagan administration wants is a full-scale war
between Nicaragua and Honduras which Nicaragua would
appear to have provoked. Such a situation would create the
perfect pretext for a U.S. invasion. The Sandinistas have
been exceedingly careful in avoiding such a provocation. Let
us hope that the Reagan administration has not been so emboldened by the recent assault on Grenada as to make this
D
pretext unnecessary.

PROFILE: NICARAGUA'S ATLANTIC COAST

Until the Sandinista Liberation Front began the difficult
task of social reconstruction, the Atlantic region of Nicaragua was ignored by the Managua government and in fact
dominated by external forces seeking to control this strategically located Central American nation. While the land of
both the Atlantic and Pacific regions was coveted and the
people of each region exploited, Nicaraguans on the Atlantic Coast were also cruelly neglected. Only the Sandinista
government has attempted to document and preserve the
region's unique cultural legacy and to ensure opportunities
for the participation of its people in Nicaraguan national
society. Unfortunately however, the complexity of the Atlantic Coast's circumstances and ethnic composition makes it
a prime target of the U.S. campaign to discredit and destabilize the Nicaraguan revolution .
By the time the Spanish "discovered" Nicaragua in 1522,
virtually all the fertile land areas were populated by Indigenous people who fiercely resisted attempts to displace them.
Thousands of Nicaragua's original inhabitants were killed
or deported to Spain's Viceroyalty of Peru before the conquistadores were able to establish settlements along the
Pacific. The Spanish were unable to effectively penetrate
the dense jungle and vast savannahs of the Atlantic, however; and the area became a haven for Africans escaping
the harshness of Caribbean slavery. Referred to as
"cimarones," these Africans joined the Indigenous peoples
of the Atlantic Coast to protect their freedom.
The Indigenous and African peoples who lived on the
Atlantic Coast were not to be left in peace. By 1604 English
slave ships arrived in an attempt to expand the plantation
economies of the Caribbean, and the English established
their first settlement on the Atlantic Coast in 1630. Twentyfive years later, they claimed as a protectorate a strip of Central America's Atlantic Coast that stretched from modern
day Belize to the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border, and by
1697 had taken an English-speaking black to Jamaica to be
crowned "King of the Mosquitia," with the governor of
Jamaica named as "Mosquitia's" president. This artificiallycreated "Indigenous monarchy" survived for almost two
full centuries as a ruse to cover England's commercial exploitation of the region's people and natural resources.
The Miskito people were but one of many Indigenous
groups which lived along the coast-each speaking their own
language, retaining their own customs, and reflecting various
degrees of African influence. English records are illustrative
of the blatant racism which characterized the period: " ...
During the last century the whole Caribbean (coast) was
flooded with escaped slaves . . . The greater the proportion
of Negro (sic) blood, the more stupid are the tribes ... "
Thus, whether_Paya, Suma, Zama, Seco, or Rama peoples,
racism led each to. be defined along a spectrum of AfroIndigepous fusion, with the percentage of African blood the
distinguishing characteristic. This ethnic composition contrasted with the Pacific, where most people were labeled
mestizos because of their Indian and Spanish origin.
Along the Atlantic Coast, foreign-owned industries stood
in sharp contrast to the feudalistic farm system in the
Pacific. The intimidation used to bind generations of peasants to family haciendas within the Pacific region was un-

necessary in the wage labor enclaves of the Atlantic, where
English-speaking blacks (Creoles) served as functionaries for
faceless corporations and controlled mostly illiterate Indigenous workers. As a result of this relative lack of repression, their geographic isolation from the brutalities of the
Somoza dictatorship, and differences in the cultural legacies
of British and Spanish colonialism, Atlantic Coast residents
remained fairly aloof from the revolutionary processes resulting in Somoza's overthrow.
Today, the historic manipulation of the Atlantic Coast
continues. U.S. sponsored forces have deliberately chosen
the Atlantic coast as a war zone. CIA-controlled forces based
in Honduras consistently cross the border to attack the traditional homes of Miskito people, forcing the Nicaraguan
government to evacuate the area and resettle the people in
order to spare civilian lives. Puerto Cabezas, an important
port on the Atlantic Coast, has been bombed by those calling themselves representatives of Indigenous people but who
are organized, financed, and directed by the CIA.
Despite total U.S . silence on the existence of Indigenous
and African people in Nicaragua during the Somoza dynasty, the Reagan administration has been quick to accuse the
Sandinistas of genocidal practices and cultural chauvinism.
Photos taken of atrocities committed during the Somoza
regime were instead attributed to the Sandinistas, and antigovernment rebels of Indigenous descent have been promoted as spokespersons of their people. Yet representative
Indigenous organizations have commended the Sandinistas
for their attempts to respect and preserve the culture and
peoples of the Coast.
The U.S. has similary disregarded other changes taking
place on the Atlantic Coast. After centuries of deliberate
neglect, roads have been built, electric and sanitation
facilities expanded, and television and telephone systems installed. Health care centers have been established to combat the rampant but preventable diseases of silicosis and
tuberculosis and to lower an infant mortality rate of one
hundred twenty per thousand. A massive literacy campaign
is being conducted in English, Miskito, and Suma in which
children are taught in their traditional language until fourth
grade when Spanish is introduced as a second language.
The U.S. has paid even less attention to changes in racial
attitudes. Under Somoza's dynasty, the fact that eighty-five
percent of Nicaragua's people are non-white was downplayed and the existence of Afro-Nicaraguans unpublicized,
but the Sandinista's proudly assert their Indigenous-African
heritage and their historic links to the Caribbean. Under
Somoza, Nicaragua's votes in the UN were aligned 100 percent with those of South Africa, one of Somoza's primary
supporters; and Nicaraguan law prohibited the immigration
of "Negroes, ... Arabs, ... and Gypsies." These policies
have been reversed by the Sandinistas, who have made
special efforts to express their solidarity with progressive
African and Caribbean countries, national liberation movements, and Indigenous organizations. Such radical shifts in
policy have helped to earn the Nicaraguan government the
respect of African and Indigenous people and the emnity
of the United States. □
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